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Abstract
We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all
values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting,
only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will
be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be
enhanced. Such an e¤ect occurs even if the cost is wasteful when there is both a large enough
density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough. If the cost is
recouped such as with a poll tax, having a cost is always benecially.
JEL codes: C70, D72.
Keywords: costly voting, externalities.
1 Introduction
"The object of our deliberations is to promote the good purposes for which elections
have been instituted, and to prevent their inconveniences." (Edmund Burke as cited in
Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, p. 19)
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Groups within society often have to make collective decisions. In order to reach correct social
decisions, the valuations of all those a¤ected by the decision should be aggregated. By leaving some
out, a group may reach an incorrect decision. For example, take a committee that must decide an
issue at a meeting. Each member has a certain private value to the results of the decision reached
by the committee. The committees social value of the decision is the sum of the individual private
values and, hence, aggregation is necessary to reach the correct decision. This scenario ts many
decision problems such as public good provision.
A common method to reach a decision is to have a vote.1 Since each member of the committee
has information that is relevant to the decision, we would normally think that ensuring all par-
ticipate in voting would improve the nal outcome. In fact, many countries (including Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, and Greece) have compulsory voting to ensure inclusion.2 There is, however,
signicant di¤erence between aggregating private values and ensuring full participation of all voters.
In social valuation, the strength of preference counts. In voting, the options for expressing
preference for any particular alternative are limited to either voting for it, or not voting for it (that
is, vote for an alternative or abstain).3 This means with voting it is not possible to demonstrate
intensity of preferences.4 One voter mildly in favor of an alternative exactly o¤sets another voter
who is strongly opposed.
These observations suggest that there may be gains, in avoiding poor outcomes, by ensuring
that voters who have only mild feelings about the alternatives are excluded. In some sense, if their
vote counts for more than their strength of feeling then they may change the voting outcome in
a detrimental way. Indeed, in Australia where voting is mandatory, donkey votes (those that
simply were cast by order of a ballot) give a 1% edge to those listed rst (see Orr, 2002, and
King and Leigh, 2009). One way to exclude such voters is to ensure that there is a cost to voting
that deters participation by those without strong preferences (or are not well informed) and hence
achieve a socially-better outcome. This intuition is contrary to the widely held view that costly
1See Drexl and Klein (2013) and Gershkov et al. (2013).
2Enforcement ranges from nes (Australia) to disenfranchisement (Belgium) or making it di¢ cult to obtain a
passport or drivers license (see The Guardian, July 4, 2005).
3Among the rare exceptions are reality TV shows such as Pop Idol where individuals can vote more than once
(and pay for each vote).
4As mentioned by Mueller (2003, page 104): Majority rule records only these ordinal preferences for each individ-
ual on the issue pair. The condition for the Pareto optimality of the supply of the public goods requires information
on the relative intensity of individual preferences."
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voting is detrimental since it deters voting (and is a cost to those that do vote) leading to a paradox
of why people vote (see Dhillon and Peralta, 2002, for an overview).
In this paper, we show that increasing costs even though they are wasteful may be benecial
using a model with a continuous distribution of values both when there is a xed number of
supporters for each outcome and when there is aggregate supporter uncertainty. We nd that
whether costly voting is superior depends upon both the expected value and the density of lower
value voters. We also show that under aggregate supporter uncertainty, a government would never
want to have mandatory voting by imposing nes or subsidizing voting but would wish to implement
a poll tax (a charge for voting) if it is politically practical.
This analysis can be seen as the normative counterpart to the positive analyses of Bulkley
et al. (2001) and Osborne et al. (2000). These papers establish that when voting is costly the
outcome of the voting game will have an equilibrium in which only voters with high values (from
the extremes) will participate. Again, at rst sight it might appear that this is a bad outcome since
it excludes moderate opinion. What we show is that instead it can be e¢ cient to have precisely
such an equilibrium.
Börgers (2000) asks a question in the spirit of our analysis. Namely, whether a reduction of the
costs of voting can be damaging. While he graphically, shows such a possibility, in his model, enough
of a reduction would always be benecial, since while there is uncertainty for which alternative a
voter prefers, there is no di¤erence in intensity of preference for a particular alternative.5 More
recently, Börgers (2004) further analyzes this type of model to show that an equilibrium with
costly voting is superior to both mandatory voting (still with voting costs) and random selection
of a winner (with no voting). Thus, mandatory voting has the benet of including all the available
information (everyone votes) and selecting the best alternative, but at the highest cost. Random
selection has the lowest cost but uses no information. The tradeo¤ between mandatory voting and
random selection is voluntary voting. This causes only those with a low cost of voting to vote and
is superior to the other options. Krasa and Polborn (2009) vary the Börgers model by allowing for
5 It is possible to see how Börgers (2000) works with a simple numerical example: There are two voters, V 1 and V 2,
and two candidates, A and B. Each voter has a 50% chance of preferring each candidate and values their candidate
winning at 1 (and the other at 0). If the cost of V 1 voting is 0:5    and V 2 voting is 0:5   2, then both will vote
and the total surplus will be 1:5   1 + 3: If costs increase such that the cost of V 1 voting is 0:5 +  and V 2 voting
is 0:5  , then only V 2 would vote yielding a surplus of 1:5  0:5 + . Of course, if voting costs drop to zero, both
will vote and surplus will be 1:5.
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ex-ante asymmetry of preferences over alternatives. They nd that for a large enough number of
voters, it is optimal to move towards mandatory voting from voluntary voting (by a penalty for
not voting or a subsidy to voting).
In our paper, we add intensity of preferences over alternatives. Now in contrast to the Börgers
model (and Krasa and Polborn), everyone voting no longer includes all information (it neglects
intensity of preference) and thus sometimes does not select the best alternative. We nd that even
if we eliminate all costs to mandatory voting by setting the cost of voting to zero, it may not
necessarily be superior. Note that unlike Ledyard (1981, 1984), we treat the alternatives as xed
(as does Börgers) and thus nd that the equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
To help understanding how we di¤er from the existing literature, let us return to our example
of a committee voting on an issue. The committee can (1) make it mandatory to show up to the
meeting (compulsory), (2) buy cookies for the meeting (inducement), (3) allow for electronic voting
(zero cost), (4) schedule the meeting late at night (create cost), or (5) charge a fee to show up to
the meeting (perhaps by means of additional work at the meeting). Börgers (2004) shows that (1)
or (2) would not be worthwhile and Börgers (2000) shows (4) may be benecially. We add to this
by conrming those results in our model and in showing that surprisingly (3) may not be benecial
and that (5) will always be benecial.6 We also show (4) may be benecial even if there is an equal
number of supporters for each alternative.
Our paper also relates to the public good provision literature. Palfrey and Ledyard (1994, 1999,
2002) look at mechanisms including simple voting schemes for providing public goods. In Palfrey
and Ledyard, the voting options are to provide or not provide a public good where provision could
have a loss for those that have little value for it and have to pay for it. In this paper we have two
options each with non-negative value and voting can potentially have a cost.
While less related, the Condorcet Jury literature models voting by a group of individuals with
a common value over two alternatives (see Young, 1988). Krishna and Morgan (2012) show that as
the cost of voting goes to zero, voluntary voting is the optimal mechanism. Ghoshal and Lockwood
(2009) have combined the common value in the Condorcet Jury literature with the private value
of alternatives and comparisons in Börgers (2004). They nd that if the voters put a high weight
6Under the Börgers (2000, 2004) framework, there is no intensity to preference, so it is best to not have voting
costs and thus (3) would always be benecial. It may be that (4) is benecial in Börgers (2000) since increasing
voting costs may reduce the overall costs of voting since the numbers that vote would decrease.
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on personal preferences then there is an ine¢ ciently high voter turnout and in the case voters
care more about the common aspect then there is an ine¢ ciently low voter turnout. Information
acquisition has been studied in the Condorcet Jury literature by allowing voters to buy information
about the common feature of the alternatives (see Persico, 2004, Gerardi and Yariv, 2005).
The lobbying literature models a similar problem (see Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992, Baye,
Kovenock and de Vries, 1993, Che and Gale, 1998, 2006, Kaplan and Wettstein, 2006). The method
of reaching a group decision is by allowing would-be voters to send a signal of how much they care:
by lobbying. With this method, we would expect that voters with strong preferences or special
interest groups to have greater inuence on the outcome than with voting. This is due to the
ability of voters with more extreme preferences to send a stronger signal. Such undue inuence
is not necessarily harmful; lobbying may be welfare enhancing over voting since under voting the
outcome can be determined by a large number of voters that do not strongly care about the outcome
or vote without any information about the specic issues. In Chakravarty and Kaplan (2010), we
determine under which conditions, a purely wasteful signal (which we call shouting) will lead to a
more e¢ cient solution than voting. In Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013), for purely private goods,
we nd the optimal allocation mechanism when only wasteful signals can be used and determine
under which conditions making use of these signals is useful.
In the next section, we provide an illustrative example with two types and two voters which
gives the basic intuition of our model. In section, 3, we examine our model when there is an equal
number of voters supporting each option and the uncertainty in the model is in the strength of
each voters support for the option. Then in section 4, we analyze the case where, in addition to
the uncertainty of the strength, there is uncertainty as to which alternative a voter supports. We
conclude in section 5.
2 Illustrative Example
Here we provide basic example that captures the main intuition of our paper. There are two options,
A and B, and two voters: one prefers A and the other prefers B. There is an 1=2 chance that a
voter has utility of v`  1 for his preferred option (and 0 for the other) and 1=2 chance of utility
of vh  5 for his preferred option (and 0 for other). If the cost of voting is 0, everyone votes and
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there is a tie that is broken randomly. Hence, the social surplus is the expected value of a preferred
choice: vh+v`2 = 3.
Now say the cost of voting is c  23 . Suppose there is an equilibrium where only those with
a high value will vote. In this case, if there is indeed a high value, then we are guaranteed that
someone will value the winner vh = 5. Otherwise (when both voters have low values), the winner
will be worth v` = 1. There is at least one high value 3=4 of the time. Thus, the surplus is
3
4  5 + 14  1 = 4: The total cost expended in voting is c since each voter votes half the time and
there are two voters. The social surplus is then 4   c = 313 . Thus, as long as this is indeed an
equilibrium, then costly voting can be socially benecial. To verify that this is an equilibrium, we
must show that both voters nd it in their individual interests to vote only with a high value. A
voter by voting improves the chance of his preferred option winning by 12 no matter what the other
voter chooses to do (since by voting ones option either goes from a tie to a win or from losing to
a tie). Hence, if one has a private value to an option of v, one votes if v2 > c. Thus, for this to be
an equilibrium we must have 52  c  12 (only the high-value voter should vote), which is satised
by c = 2=3.
In this example, we compare two situations, one with costly voting and one with free voting,
and nd that, in fact, costly voting is superior. Hence, adding a cost to voting can be welfare
enhancing. This captures the intuition behind this phenomena, namely, with costly voting, only
those with high enough values would choose to incur the cost to voting, while with free voting, all
values are counted equally regardless of how valuable they may be.
Notice that there are two important components of this model that enable costly voting to be
superior to free voting. First, the di¤erence between the high value and low value must be large
enough. If instead of 5, the value were 3, then costly voting would be inferior. (Social surplus with
costly voting would be 34  3 + 14  1   23 = 116 and with free voting the social surplus would be 2.)
Second, the probability of having a low value should be su¢ ciently large. For instance, if instead
of 1=2 this was 1=4, then again costly voting would be inferior.
We see this further in Table 1 which provides a breakdown of the surplus in each of the four
states of nature (the four possible outcomes of the two votersvalues). We see under free voting
the social surplus is the average of the two individual values since both voters vote and there is no
cost of voting. Comparing this to the case where the cost of voting is 2=3, we see that there is no
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No cost Cost of 23
v` vh v` vh
v` 1;1
1
1;5
3
1; 1
1
1;5
5  2
3
vh 5;1
3
5;5
5
5; 1
5  2
3
5;5
5  4
3
Table 1: Social surplus of voting. Value of winning for each voter with those that vote in bold.
Underneath is the social surplus including voting costs
di¤erence when both voters have a low value v`. When one voter has a low value and one voter has
a high value, there is a net gain. The expected value of the winner goes up from 3 to 5 with a cost
of voting of 2=3. However, when both voters have a high value, there is a net loss. The expected
value of the winner is the same under both regimes, but both voters incur the cost of 2=3. The
gains in the two states are higher the higher the di¤erence between both values. The odds of both
having high values relative to just one having a high value is reduced the higher the chance of a
low type.
Let us examine the model with a general v` and vh, and with p denoting the probability of
having a low value. By analysis similar to that in Table 1, the gains from voting is by having a
voter with a high value instead of a low value in the upper right and lower left corners of the table.
This gain is realized half the time since with free voting the voter with the high type will win the
coin ip half the time. Hence, the di¤erence is (vh   v`)=2. We are in these two boxes with chance
2p(1  p). In expectation, the gain is then (vh   v`)p(1  p). Since each voter will only vote with a
high type, the cost of voting is 2(1  p)c. Dividing both the gain and cost by (1  p), we see there
is a net gain to voting if (vh   v`)p  2c. This would be an equilibrium if vh=2  c  v`=2. Again,
we see that for there to exist a benet of costly voting, relative to the voting cost, the di¤erence
between the high value and low value must be large enough as well as the probability of a low type.
However, for the benet it must also be an equilibrium for only a voter with a high value to vote.
This requires that the cost is such that twice of it is between the high and low values. In the next
two sections, we will see that insight gained from this example carries over to more general models.
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3 Aggregate Supporter Certainty
3.1 Model
Here we model a committee making a binary decision such as which of two districts, A or B, to build
a casino. There are an equal number of representatives from each district, and each representative
has a private value for it being built in his district and a common cost for showing up to vote.
Formally, there are two types of voters and n voters of each type (overall there are 2n voters).
Each voter has cost c  0: Assume that each voter i has value vi  0 that is randomly drawn
according to the non-atomic cumulative distribution F which has support [0; v], where v > 2c.
If 1  i  n, voter i is a type A voter who values a win by A at vi and a win by B at 0. If
n+ 1  i  2n, voter i is a type B voter who values a win by B at vi and a win by A at 0. Choice
A wins if the number of votes it receives, denoted by #A; is strictly greater the number of votes
choice B receives, denoted by #B. Choice B wins if #B > #A. If there is a tie, #B = #A, then
the winner is determined randomly with equal probability of each winning. Note that the voters
preferences for platform A or B is modelled in the style of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985).
3.2 Equilibrium and social surplus
Denote v(c) as a cuto¤ strategy such that a voter i votes if his value is above v(c) and doesnt
vote if his value is below v(c). We denote Pr i(eventjv) as the probability that event occurs
given that all voters except voter i follows cuto¤ strategy v(c) and voter i does not vote.
A voter i where 1  i  n (a type A) and with value vi will vote if
vi

1
2
Pr i(#A = #Bjv) + 1
2
Pr i(#A = #B   1jv)

> c:
The expression Pr i(#A = #Bjv) represents the case when all other votes are tied. Hence,
voter i is pivotal since by i voting, the outcome will change the vote from a tie to a win by voting.
The expression Pr i(#A = #B   1jv) represents the case when voter i will change the outcome of
a vote from losing to a tie. The gains in either instance is half the value, vi2 .
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Lemma 1 A cuto¤ v(c) forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if
v
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

F (v)2(n i 1) (1  F (v))2i

1 +
2i  n+ 1
n  i  F (v
)

= 2c: (1)
Proof. The cuto¤ will be such that the value for voting equals the cost.
v(c) 

1
2
Pr i(#A = #Bjv) + 1
2
Pr i(#A = #B   1jv)

= c:
When the voter i prefers A (i  n); we can rewrite the probabilities in this equation as follows:
Pr i(#A = #Bjv)
= Pr i(#A = #B = 0jv) + Pr i(#A = #B = 1jv) + :::+ Pr i(#A = #B = n  1jv)
=
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i

(1  F (v))2i F (v)2(n i) 1
and
Pr i(#A = #B   1jv)
= Pr i(#A = 0;#B = 1jv) + Pr i(#A = 1;#B = 2jv) + :::+ Pr i(#A = n  1;#B = njv)
=
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

(1  F (v))2i+1 F (v)2(n i 1) :
Substituting these expressions into the cuto¤ value equation yields:
v
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i

(1  F (v))2i F (v)2(n i) 1 +

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

(1  F (v))2i+1 F (v)2(n i 1)

= 2c:
(2)
Since the equilibrium entails the probability of being pivotal equalling twice costs over benets, the
above equation resembles the equilibrium condition in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985). This
equation can then be simplied as
v
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

F (v)2(n i 1) (1  F (v))2i

1 +
2i  n+ 1
n  i  F (v
)

= 2c
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The same equation holds for voters preferring B (i > n):
Lemma 2 When there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes, v(0) = 0:
Proof. This follows directly from equation (1).
Lemma 3 If n = 1 or limv!0 vF 0(v) = 0; then limc!0 vc (c) = 2:
Proof. Equation (1) must hold for all c, so we can take the derivative w.r.t. c and take the limit
as c! 0. As c! 0; we have v ! 0 (from Lemma 2), so limv!0 (1  F ) = 1; limv!0 F = 0: Notice
that from this we need only worry about the term when i = n   1: (For n > 1, the rest vanish.)
This yields: h
1  (n  1) lim
v!0
v  F 0(v)
i
=
2
vc (0)
:
Hence, vc (0) = 2 when n = 1 or limv!0 vF 0(v) = 0:
Lemma 4 The social surplus to voting is the expected value of the winner minus the costs of voting:
SSV (c) =
nX
a=0
nX
b=0

n
a

n
b

F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b
24 (n maxfa; bg)E[vjv < v(c)]+
maxfa; bgE[vjv > v(c)]
35(3)
 2(1  F (v(c)))n  c:
The expected value of the winner is computed by going through the possible number of voters
for each candidate where a is the votes for candidate A and b is the votes for candidate B. The
probability of each case is calculated and multiplied by the expected value of the winner, which is
calculated by the expected value of those that voted for the winner plus the expected value of those
that wanted the winner to win but nonetheless didnt vote for him. The expression 2n(1 F (v(c)))c
is the expected cost of the voters voting since 1  F (v(c)) is the probability of each voter voting
and there are n voters of each type.
3.3 When is it optimal to have a voting cost?
In the following proposition, we derive the conditions when it is optimal to have a cost.
Proposition 1 If limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0 and E[v] F 0(0) > 1; then it is optimal
to have c > 0.
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Proof. To show that it is optimal to have c > 0, it is su¢ cient to show that limc!0 SSV 0(c) > 0.
We will prove this by showing that the derivative of the expected value of the voters that prefer
the winning candidate is higher than the derivative of the expected costs.
Given limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0 and E[v]  F 0(0) > 1, the derivative of SSV
as c goes to 0 can be determined as follows. Using the product rule, the derivative is equal to the
sum of the values times the derivative of the probabilities plus the sum of the probabilities times
the derivative of the values. The probability of a voters voting for A and b voters voting for B
is
 
n
a
 
n
b

F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b : The limit of this term as c ! 0 is zero if a + b < 2n
and 1 if a + b = 2n. If a + b = 0, then the derivative of this probability term is 2nF 2n 1F 0vc
which goes to 0 since limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0 and limc!0 vc = 2 by Lemma 3. If a + b = 2n, the
derivative is  2n (1  F )2n 1 F 0vc which goes to  2nF 0vc. Otherwise, the derivative of this term is 
n
a
 
n
b
 h
(2n  a  b)F (v(c))2n a b 1 (1  F (v(c)))a+b   (a+ b)F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b 1
i
F 0vc
which goes to zero unless a+b = 2n 1 in which case it goes to  na nbF 0vc. Note that a+b = 2n 1
when either a = n and b = n  1 or vice-versa. In each case,  na nb = n.
Let us now look at the sum of the values times the derivative of the probabilities. When
a+ b = n, we have (n maxfa; bg)E[vijvi < v(c)] +maxfa; bgE[vijvi > v(c)] = nE[vijvi > v(c)]:
When a + b = 2n   1; we also have (n  maxfa; bg)E[vijvi < v(c)] + maxfa; bgE[vijvi > v(c)] =
nE[vijvi > v(c)]: Thus, when multiplied by the derivative of the probabilities and summed over
the possible values for a and b, the limit goes to 0.
We are left with the sum of the probabilities times the derivative of the values. As we saw
above, as c goes to 0 the only time the probabilities are non-zero is when a = b = n. Thus,
lim
c!0
SSV 0(c) =
ndE[vijvi > v(c)]
dc
  2n+ lim
c!0
4n  c  F 0(v(c)):
Since E[vjv > v(c)] =
R1
v(c) vdF (v)
1 F (v(c)) , we have
dE[vjv > v(c)]
dc
=
 vc (c)v(c)F 0(v(c))
(1  F (v(c)) +
F 0(v(c))vc (c)
R1
v(c) vdF (v)
(1  F (v(c))2 :
Hence, limc!0
dE[vjv>v(c)]
dc = limc!0 2F
0(v(c))
R1
0 vdF (v) = limc!0 2F
0(v(c))E[v]: Thus, if
F 0(0)E[v] > 1; SSV 0(0) > 0 and it is optimal to increase costs.
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Note that even though there is a unique equilibrium at c = 0, when c > 0, there is a possibility
of multiple equilibria (see Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, 1985). However, even if this is the case,
under these conditions we have shown that all of the equilibria must yield higher social surplus
than the equilibrium when c = 0.
Of the three conditions of Proposition 1, the rst two, limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0,
are fairly innocuous. Anytime F 0(0) is nite they are satised. The last condition, E[v] F 0(0) > 1,
is the one of interest and has two components that depend upon the distribution of v: the density
at zero and the expected value. The combination of these two components must be large enough.
Too low a value of the density at zero would mean that increasing cost does not eliminate enough
low value votes. Too low an expected value would mean that the benet to eliminating these
low-value voters is not large enough. This condition is equivalent to limc!0
dE[vjv>v(c)]
dc > 2: This
implies that the expected value of those voting is increasing in cost by a su¢ cient amount, namely
2. In other words, if one increases cost marginally by a dollar (at zero), then the expected value
of those voting should go up by 2 in order for costly voting to be benecial. This condition is also
equivalent to limv!0
dE[vjv>v]
dv > 1: This states that the mean-residual-lifetime function (MRL) of
F is strictly increasing at zero. It is satised by all strict log-convexity distributions (see Proposition
2 of Heckman and Honore, 1990). Similar conditions (such as having a monotone MRL) are used
in a variety of economic applications (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). These include McAfee
and Miller (2012) who show that an increasing MRL at zero implies allocating appointments (or
objects) by reservations is ine¢ cient for low transportation costs.
The following example illustrates Proposition 1.
Example 1 F (v) = v where  > 0, c < 1=2; n = 1.
We have limv!0 vF 0(v) = limv!0 v = 0. From (1), v(c) = 2c: We can then write equation
(3) as
(2c)2E[vjv < 2c] + (1  (2c)2)E[vjv > 2c]  2(1  (2c))c
=
  2c(1 + ) + (2c)(+ 2c)
1 + 
:
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Figure 2. The social surplus net of voting costs versus the cost of voting c when F (v) = v0:5 and
n = 1.
If  = 0:5; the net surplus is plotted in Figure 2. As we see here, the ideal c is strictly positive.
It reaches a maximum at c  0:0223: We can also examine the probability density function of v.
This density is 0:5v :5 and shown in Figure 3:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1
2
3
4
5
v
density
Figure 3. The graph of the density function of f(v) = 0:5v 0:5 and a vertical line at v = 2c at
c  0:0223 (the optimal c):
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In Figure 3, the voters to the left of the vertical line do not vote when c is at the optimal level.
We now ask: in our example, for which  is there a gain in surplus to increasing the cost of voting?
For n = 1, the slope of the surplus w.r.t. c is
SSV 0(c) =  2 + 2
c 1(2 + 2(1 + )c)
1 + 
:
For  > 1 ; limc!0 SSV 0(c) =  2: For  = 1; limc!0 SSV 0(c) =  1: For 0 <  < 1; limc!0 SSV 0(c) =
1. Hence, when 0 <  < 1, the surplus improves by increasing the cost. It also turns out that for
  1, the surplus is at the highest when cost is zero. (When   1; SSV 0(c) is strictly increasing
in c for all c > 0, hence SSV 0(c) can equal zero only once. Since SSV (0) = SSV (1=2); no one
votes in either case, and SSV 0(0) < 0, that point at which SSV 0(c) = 0 must be a minimum.)
We also see that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satised in Example 1 for 1=2   < 1.
We have E[v] = +1 and for 0 <  < 1, F
0(0) = lim!0 v 1 =1. Hence, F 0(0)E[v] > 1. Also,
limv!0 F 0(v)v = v = 0. If   1=2, we further have limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = v2 1 = 0. We also
demonstrate with this example that Proposition 1s conditions are su¢ cient but not necessary.
4 Aggregate supporter uncertainty.
4.1 Model and Initial Results
In the previous section, we assumed that there were an equal number of supporters for either A or B.
Here we assume there are n voters and each voter has an equal and independent chance of desiring
each outcome. This leads to aggregate supporter uncertainty (ASU). Again, each voter has a level
of support for his desired outcome drawn according to the non-atomic cumulative distribution
function F with support [0; v], where v > 2c. The voter preferences over platforms is similar in
style to that in Börgers (2000, 2004), we will discuss the di¤erences later.
In the following lemma, we show there is a unique equilibrium and determine its cuto¤condition.
Lemma 5 There is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium with cuto¤ v(c) that satises
v
n 1X
a=0

n  1
a

F (v)n 1 a (1  F (v))a
8<:
 
a
a=2
  
1
2
a
if a is even, 
a
(a 1)=2
  
1
2
a
if a is odd.
= 2c: (4)
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Proof. There are n voters overall. Take the decision of an individual voter. Consider each case
where exactly a other voters vote. This occurs with probability
 
n 1
a

F (v)n 1 a (1  F (v))a.
If a is even, this voter is pivotal only if there is a tie. This happens if exactly a=2 vote for each
outcome, which occurs with probability
 
a
a=2
  
1
2
a
. If a is odd then the voter is pivotal if there
is exactly one less voter that votes for his preferred outcome. This has (a   1)=2 voting for his
outcome and (a + 1)=2 voting for the other outcome. This occurs with probability
 
a
(a 1)=2
  
1
2
a
.
Using the above forms equation (4). The LHS of (4) is 0 when v = 0. The LHS equals v when
v = v which is larger than 2c. Hence, since the LHS is continuous, there exists an interior solution
to the equation. Finally, we want to show uniqueness. The probability of being pivotal given that a
other voters vote is decreasing in a. As v increases the distribution of the number of other voters
stochastically shifts downwards. Hence, as v increases, the overall probability of being pivotal
increases. Thus, the LHS of (4) is strictly increasing in v and we have a unique solution.
Lemma 6 When there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes, v(0) = 0:
Proof. This follows directly from equation (4).
Lemma 7 If limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; then
lim
c!0
vc(c) =
8><>:
2n
( n 1n=2 1)
if n is even,
2n
( n 1(n 1)=2)
if n is odd.
Proof. We can then take the total derivative w.r.t. c of the cuto¤ equation (4).
If limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; then the only term remaining on the LHS is when a = n  1. Thus,
lim
c!0
vc (c) = 2=
8<:
 
n 1
(n 1)=2
  
1
2
n 1
if n  1 is even, 
n 1
(n 2)=2
  
1
2
n 1
if n  1 is odd.
= 2n=
8<:
 
n 1
(n 1)=2

if n is odd, 
n 1
n=2 1

if n is even.
:
Proposition 2 Under ASU, if n is even, limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0; and E[v] 
F 0(0) > 12 ; then it is optimal to have c > 0.
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Proof. The social surplus of the equilibrium (above random allocation) is the expected benets
minus the costs of voting. The expected benets depends only upon the number of voters that vote
(in expectation all those that dont vote balance each other out). If two vote for an option and two
vote against it, the surplus is zero. If three vote for an option and two vote against it, the surplus
is E[VijVi > v(c)]: In general, the social surplus is the number that voter for the winning option
minus the number that vote for the losing option times E[VijVi > v(c)]: Given there is an equal
chance that a voter that chooses to vote votes for either option, the number of votes for option A
minus those for option B follows a one-dimensional random walk as voters vote. The social surplus
given that a certain number of voters vote is the expected absolute value of this number times
E[VijVi > v(c)]: If a voters vote, then this expectation is
8<:
(a 1)!!
(a 2)!! if a is even,
a!!
(a 1)!! if a is odd.
(see Weisstein,
2010). Note that the double factorial; n!!; is either all strictly positive even numbers up to n
multiplied together or all strictly positive odd numbers up to n multiplied together depending
upon whether n is even or odd.
SSV (c) =
nX
a=0

n
a

F (v(c))n a (1  F (v(c)))a
24E[vjv > v(c)] 
8<:
(a 1)!!
(a 2)!! if a is even,
a!!
(a 1)!! if a is odd.
35
 (1  F (v(c)))n  c:
Taking the limit as c! 0 of the derivative yields:
lim
c!0
SSV 0(c) = lim
c!0
vc
0BBBBBB@

dE[vjv>v(c)]
dv   nE[vjv > v(c)]F 0(v(c))


8<:
(n 1)!!
(n 2)!! if n is even,
n!!
(n 1)!! if n is odd.
+nE[vjv > v(c)]  F 0(v(c))
8<:
(n 2)!!
(n 3)!! if n is odd,
(n 1)!!
(n 2)!! if n is even.
1CCCCCCA(5)
+ lim
c!0
F 0((v(c)))n  vc  c  n.
Note that vc
dE[vjv>v(c)]
dv =
dE[vjv>v(c)]
dc and limc!0
dE[vjv>v(c)]
dc = F
0(0)E[v] limc!0 vc, thus limc!0
dE[vjv>v(c)]
dv =
E[v] F 0(0). Also note that limc!0 F 0((v(c))) vc c = 0 if limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0 and vc is nite. Hence,
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we can simplify (5) to yield:
lim
c!0
SSV 0(c) =

lim
c!0
vc

E[v]  F 0(0)
0@n
8<:
(n 2)!!
(n 3)!! if n is odd,
(n 1)!!
(n 2)!! if n is even.
  (n  1)
8<:
(n 1)!!
(n 2)!! if n is even,
n!!
(n 1)!! if n is odd.
1A
 n:
Look at the case when n is even. We have: limc!0 SSV 0(c) = 2n=
 
n 1
n=2 1
 (n 1)!!
(n 2)!!  E[v]F 0(0)   n =
2n  (n=2 1)!(n=2)!(n 1)!  (n 1)!!(n 2)!! E[v]F 0(0)  n: Since 2
n=2
n! =
1
(n=2)!(n 1)!! and 2
n=2 1 (n=2  1)! = (n  2)!!,
we have limc!0 SSV 0(c) = (2E[v]F 0(0)  1)  n. Now this is strictly greater than zero if and only if
E[v]  F 0(0) > 12 :
Note that if we try the same method when n is odd, we have: limc!0 SSV 0(c) = 2
n
( n 1(n 1)=2)
E[v] 
F 0(0)

n (n 2)!!(n 3)!!   n!!(n 3)!!

 n =  n. Now this is never greater than zero. Hence, in that case, using
this method we are unable to determine when it is optimal to have a positive cost when n is odd.
Notice that the condition with aggregate supporter uncertainty E[v]  F 0(0) > 12 and an even
number of voters is weaker than that when there is certainty E[v]  F 0(0) > 1 (which by our
assumptions also has an even number of total voters). Thus, for all distributions where it would
be worthwhile to have voting costs without uncertainty in number of supporters for each outcome,
it would also be worthwhile to have positive voting costs with such supporter uncertainty.
4.2 What is the optimal level of voting?
We saw in the previous subsection that voting, even if it is costly, can have benets to social surplus.
However, in the previous subsections, who voted was determined by equilibrium conditions. In this
subsection, we wish to ask what should be the correct level of voting for society. This is the
equivalent of asking if a social planner can decide a critical level of value only above which people
should vote, what should it be?
Finding this level allows us to compare the optimal level to the equilibrium level. We can then
ask what policy recommendations we can give to induce this level having penalties for not voting
or adding a poll tax. These penalties and taxes are just transfers and thus do not a¤ect overall
welfare.7 Remember, in contrast, a cost of voting yields no direct benet to anyone and given
7Another method would be to employ some criteria for voting that reects values. For instance, Je¤erson felt
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the same voting outcome is a waste to society. In the following proposition, we can compare the
equilibrium with the optimal level of voting.
Proposition 3 Under ASU, (i) there is overvoting (ii) there should be no nes to encourage voting
(no mandatory voting) (iii) there should be a poll tax to discourage voting.
Proof. A voters vote will be pivotal in two instances. Case (A): when there is a tie in votes without
his vote. Case (B): when the other candidate leads by 1 without his vote. In case (A), there will
be no externality imposed since the other voters balance each other out. For case (B), the net
externality imposed by a voter on others by voting is E[vjv > v]. This externality is negative and
a voter doesnt take this into account. Thus, in an optimal there should be less voting. Formalizing
this logic, the optimal cuto¤ (if interior) should then solve:
n 1X
a=0

n  1
a

F (v)n 1 a (1  F (v))a
8<:
 
a
a=2
  
1
2
a
v if a is even, 
a
(a 1)=2
  
1
2
a
(v   E[vjv > v]) if a is odd.
= 2c:
(6)
From this equation, the equilibrium cuto¤ will then be lower than the optimal cuto¤. To see
this the LHS is similar to the LHS of equation (4) but (v   E[vjv > v]) multiplied by one of the
probabilities instead of v, which is then smaller. Since the LHS of (4) is increasing in v. The LHS
of (4) will be smaller than 2c for all v less than the equilibrium cuto¤. Consequently, the LHS of
(6) is smaller than 2c for all v less than the equilibrium cuto¤. Hence, the solution to (6) must be
higher than the equilibrium cuto¤. Since the optimal level of voting is lower than the equilibrium
level, a government could charge for voting in order to implement the optimal cuto¤. This would be
change the c in equation (4) such that the v that solves that the solution of equation (4) matches
the solution to the equation (6). Note that while (6) may have more than one solution, all solutions
would be at a higher v, then the equilibrium. Also, the only possible non-interior optimal cuto¤
for c > 0 is where no one votes (it can never be socially optimal for a zero-valued voter to vote).
Thus again, the optimal cuto¤ would be higher than the equilibrium.
Börgers (2000, 2004) develops a model with costly voting and shows (in Börgers, 2004) that
only the educated should vote (Padover 1952, page 43). In our model, they would have better information and hence
higher values for certain candidates. There have also been literacy and property ownership as requirements. While
literacy might have been used to disenfranchise certain minority groups, a property ownership requirement for the
most part was to restrict voting to groups that had a stake in the country (high values).
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the unique equilibrium is superior to both mandatory voting still with voting costs (or equivalently
bribing people to vote) and random choice (with no one voting). He also graphically shows (in
Börgers, 2000) that the unique equilibrium may be superior to one with lower voting costs, but
importantly did not show that it is superior to one with zero voting costs. With the technique
used in the above proposition, it becomes apparent that Börgers (2004) also has overvoting.8 The
main di¤erence of our model to that of Börgers (2000, 2004) is that we allow for di¤erent intensities
of preferences while Börgers (2000, 2004) has di¤erent voting costs. In both models, it is always
optimal to charge a poll tax when there is a positive cost of voting; however, only in our model is
it worthwhile to have a poll tax when the cost of voting is zero. This is because when the marginal
voter has a value of 0 and when pivotal (moving from a loss to a tie) is replacing a voter with a
higher value. In Börgers (2000, 2004), it is optimal to have all voters voting when there is zero
voting costs, since everyone has the same valuation (in absolute terms) and thus this will maximize
the information aggregated.
There are no restrictions on F for a poll tax to be optimal. The tax is a transfer unlike a
wasteful cost of voting so is a superior alternative. It is not clear that a poll tax is politically
viable. This then leads to our previous sub-section where it may be worthwhile to maintain (or
even induce) a cost of voting. Doing so eliminates voters with little intensity for their preferred
candidate.
5 Conclusion
Since the nineteenth century, political scientists have been in agreement that increasing the franchise
will be benecial to the society (Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, page 19). So over the last century
in democracies, the right to vote has been given to most of the adult society and the requirements
of registration to vote such as property qualications have been removed. Social scientists have
further asked the question whether or not it makes sense to require people to vote. In addition
this requirement to vote also gets around the paradox that since each individual may nd his vote
negligible will choose not to vote if there is a cost to voting. We show that not only should one not
require people to vote but there is a distinct benet to having some people not vote and increasing
8The externality imposed on others by voting is absent in case (A) and equal to the value in case (B). For the
same reason as the proof of Proposition 2, there is overvoting in the Börgers model as well.
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the (wasteful) cost to voting may paradoxically be benecial to society. (Note increasing a wasteful
cost of voting may be politically more viable than imposing a poll tax.) For instance, if a committee
has an important vote, scheduling the meeting at an inconvenient time may improve the outcome.
This also shows that allowing absentee ballots or internet voting can be damaging.9
Since this is the rst paper to show that it may be benecial having costly voting (over costless
voting), there are many directions of future research where one can expand the result. One direction
is to increase the number of alternatives on the ballot to more than two. With committee voting
this seems quite logical. Furthermore, once this is done, one can introduce approval voting to
ameliorate strategic voting (see Brams and Fishburn, 1978). Another direction is to introduce a
common value element in addition to a private value as in Osborne and Turner (2010).
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